Syrian Opposition Forces - Risks and Prospects for the Middle East Region
Keywords:
Syria, Syrian Civil War, Bashar al-Assad, Terrorism, Syrian Opposition ForcesAbstract
The article is devoted to the opposition wing involved in the Syrian civil war and the risks and prospects that the opposition forces pose to Syria and the Middle East region.
The paper discusses the origins of the Syrian civil war, the current architecture of the war, and the characteristics that distinguish Syria from other Arab states. The article evaluates the results of the Arab Spring in the Middle East and Syria in particular, based on the opinions of researchers and the author’s personal opinions, and analyzes the policy changes of the current Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, after the Arab Spring. Moreover, the paper assesses the recent political history of Syria as a timeline between two dictators that led Syria to total destruction and to becoming a hub of terrorism.
The work describes extremist organizations operating in Syria, their tactics, and their strategy. Additionally, all the factors that contribute to the fragility of Syrian statehood are briefly reviewed. The paper also analyzes the goals and interests of each external actor involved in the conflict and the dangers their involvement in the war and/or support of internal opposition groups creates both locally and globally. The economic and humanitarian consequences of the Syrian civil war are presented at the end of the paper, and the impact of the event on the security environment of the region, including the Caucasus region, is assessed. It is worth noting that the work is focused on the political, economic, and social consequences of the conflict, which are particularly heavy and difficult to solve.
In the end, the paper reviews the perspectives of conflict resolution based on experts’ and the author’s personal opinions.
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